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CASE COMMENTS
FEDERAL ABSTENTION AND THE DEMISE OF
STATE BAIL REVIEW
Wallace v. Kern*
INTRODUCTION
The doctrine of abstention, under which a federal court may
refuse to exercise its jurisdiction, is a narrow exception to the duty
of the court to decide a controversy properly before it.' Abstention is
a judicial invention, intended to provide "appropriate deference" to
the respective competencies of the state and federal court systems. 2
Case law has confined the circumstances appropriate for abstention
to three general categories.3 In the first instance, abstention is
appropriate in cases presenting federal constitutional questions
which might be mooted by state court determination of the accom-
panying state issues.4 Secondly, abstention is warranted if federal
review of a state issue would be disruptive of state efforts to
establish a coherent policy with respect to a matter of substantial
public concern.5 Finally, abstention is required when, absent a
showing of immediate irreparable harm, bad faith prosecution, or a
patently unconstitutional statute, federal jurisdiction has been
invoked to restrain pending state criminal proceedings.6
*520 F.2d 400 (2d Cir. 1975), cert. denied, - U.S. - , 96 S.Ct. 1109 (1976).
1. Colorado River Water Conser. Dist. v. United States, - U.S_ 96 S.
Ct. 1236, 1244 (1976); County of Allegheny v. Frank Mashuda Co., 360 U.S. 185, 188-
89 (1959). See also Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264 (1821).
2. England v. Louisiana State Bd. of Medical Examiners, 375 U.S. 411, 415
(1964). See Colorado River Water Conser. Dist. v. United States, -U.S. , 96 S.Ct.
1236, 1244 (1976).
3. Colorado River Water Conser. Dist. v. United States, - U.S. -, 96 S.
Ct. 1236, 1244 (1976).
4. Id.; County of Allegheny v. Frank Mashuda Co., 360 U.S. 185, 189 (1959).
See, e.g., Lake Carriers Ass'n v. MacMullan, 406 U.S. 498 (1972); United Gas Pipeline
Co. v. Ideal Cement, 369 U.S. 134 (1962); R.R. Comm'n of Texas v. Pullman Co., 312
U.S. 496 (1941).
5. Colorado River Water Conser. Dist. v. United States, - U.S. - , 96 S.
Ct. 1236, 1244-45 (1976). See, e.g., Kaiser Steel Corp. v. W.S. Ranch Co., 391 U.S. 593.
(1968); Louisiana Power & Light Co. v. City of Thibodaux, 360 U.S. 25 (1959);
Burford v. Sun Oil Co., 319 U.S. 315 (1943); Hawks v. Hamill, 288 U.S. 52 (1933).
6. Colorado River Water Conser. Dist. v. United States, - U.S. -. , 96 S.
Ct. 1236, 1245-46, 1246 n.22 (1976). See, e.g., Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37
(1971); Douglas v. City of Jeanette, 319 U.S. 157 (1943).
The Supreme Court has also used the third abstention category to refrain from
enjoining state nuisance proceedings antecedent to a criminal obscenity prosecution,
Huffman v. Pursue, Ltd., 420 U.S. 592 (1975), and collection of state taxes, Great
et al.: Federal Abstention and the Demise State Bail Review (Wallace v. K
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In Wallace v. Kern,7 a case involving this third abstention
category, state criminal bail proceedings were enjoined by a federal
district court to protect the bail rights of pretrial detainees.8 On
appeal, the Second Circuit ruled that abstention was the proper
course of action and reversed the district court order as an improper
intrusion into state criminal procedure. The circuit court held that
federal intervention in Wallace would preempt available state bail
remedies and violate established principles of comity and fed-
eralism. However, when viewed in the light of current abstention
principles,9 the facts of Wallace are not supportive of the Second
Circuit decision. The state bail review procedures in Wallace did
not afford adequate protection for the due process rights of pretrial
detainees. Consequently, injunctive relief by the district court was a
proper exception to the federal abstention rule.
FACTS OF THE CASE
Wallace v. Kern was a class action to obtain pretrial bail view
and other relief for felony defendants awaiting indictment, trial or
sentencing in the Brooklyn House of Detention for Men. 10 The
defendants were state court judges and local court personnel1' who
either presided over or administered criminal cases in the Brooklyn
area of Kings County, New York. The plaintiffs alleged that the
burgeoning criminal caseload of the state courts caused excessive
pretrial delays and the consequent confinement of unconvicted
detainees for prolonged periods of time which violated their consti-
tutional rights to effective assistance of counsel, speedy trial, and
freedom from deprivation of liberty without due process of law. It
was further argued that the various court practices stemming from
Lake Dredge & Dock Co. v. Huffman, 319 U.S. 293 (1943). See Colorado River Water
Conser. Dist. v. United States, supra.
7. 520 F.2d 400 (2d Cir. 1975), cert. denied, - U.S. -, 96 S. Ct. 1109
(1976).
8. The Supreme Court has implied that the bail provisions of the eighth
amendment are applicable to the states as an element of due process. Schilb v.
Kuebel, 404 U.S. 357, 365 (1971); Stack v. Boyle, 342 U.S. 1 (1951). The Second
Circuit has held that the due process provision of the fourteenth amendment
prohibits the states from arbitrarily or unreasonably denying adequate bail to the
criminally accused. United States ex reL Goodman v. Kehl, 456 F.2d 863, 868 (2d Cir.
1972).
9. See Colorado River Water Conser. Dist. v. United States, - U.S. -, 96
S. Ct. 1236 (1976); Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103 (1975); O'Shea v. Littleton, 414 U.S.
488 (1974); Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971).
10. Plaintiffs prayed for interlocutory and permanent relief under Section 1 of
the Civil Rights Act of 1971, 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1970), and 23 U.S.C. §§ 2201-02 (1970),
to assure bail relief as required by the eighth and fourteenth amendments.
11. Defendants included the six individual justices of the Supreme Court of
Kings County, the Clerk of the Criminal Term, and local administrative officials. 520
F.2d at 401.
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the overcrowded docket had the effect of intimidating and coercing
the detainees into pleading guilty rather than standing trial. Finally,
the plaintiffs contended that the incarceration of indigent detainees
without adequate pre-detention bail hearings violated the equal
protection and due process clauses of the fourteenth amendment. 12
The issues raised by the detainees were separated for trial into
three parts before Judge Orrin G. Judd of the Federal District
Court for the Eastern District of New York. Wallace Ps addressed
the issue of inadequate assistance of counsel, while Wallace II4
12. The specific claims for relief are enumerated in Wallace v. Kern, 499 F.2d
1345, 1347 n.2 (2d Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 947 (1975).
13. Wallace v. Kern, 392 F. Supp. 834 (E.D.N.Y.), rev'd per curiam, 481 F.2d
621 (2d Cir. 1973), cert, denied, 414 U.S. 1135 (1974) [hereinafter cited as Wallace I].
In Wallace I, after exhaustive hearings the district court found that the
"overburdened, fragmented system used by Legal Aid [charged with representing
indigents in Kings County] [did] not measure up to the constitutionally required
level." 392 F. Supp. at 847. Consequently, the district court preliminarily enjoined
the defendant Legal Aid Society from accepting more than 40 pending felony cases
per attorney at a time, and further ordered the Clerk of the Criminal Term to place
on the calendar all pro se motions filed by the inmates of the Brooklyn House of
Detention.
Defendants argued that the district court should abstain completely from
interference with the Kings County jail system on grounds of comity. In rejecting
this contention, the court, citing Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962), stated:
[Wihile the court remains mindful of the limitations on federal court
intrusion in a state's criminal justice system, it bears reiteration that the
crisis situation in the Kings County Supreme Court, its long existence, and
failure of the state and city thus far to provide effective remedies justifies
federal court action.
392 F. Supp at 848 (emphasis added). Judge Judd was not about to abstain because
of time-worn promises of state remedial action:
Where there is a present violation of constitutional rights, the hope of
delayed correction by the state (or the city) should not stay the hand of a
federal court. Watson v. City of Memphis, 373 U.S. 526, 532-33, 83 S. Ct.
1314, 1318, 10 L. Ed. 2d 529 (1963); Rozecki v. Caughn, 459 F.2d 6 (1st Cir.
1972).
392 F. Supp. at 847 (emphasis added).
Although the members of the Second Circuit professed to be "entirely sympa-
thetic with the purposes which the district court judge sought to accomplish by his
order," they "felt restrained" to reverse on jurisdictional grounds. 499 F.2d at 622. In
a per curiam opinion, the circuit court, citing Le/court v. Legal Aid Society, 445 F.2d
1150 (2d Cir. 1971), found that the Legal Aid Society did not act "under color of state
law" within the meaning of 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Furthermore, and without citing any
authority, the court found that comity considerations barred the order requiring
placing pro se motions on the calendar.
14. Wallace v. Kern, 371 F. Supp. 1384 (E.D.N.Y.), rev'd, 499 F.2d 1345 (2d Cir.
1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 947 (1975) [hereinafter cited as Wallace II].
In Wallace II, after a second set of hearings, the district court held that the
"notorious and chronic" trial delays of up to nine months in Kings County Supreme
et al.: Federal Abstention and the Demise State Bail Review (Wallace v. K
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concentrated on the problem of chronic trial delay in the state
courts. Wallace 111,15 the subject of this commentary, was an
attempt to correct the allegedly unconstitutional state bail proce-
dures of Kings County through federal intervention.
The district court in Wallace III found the bail procedures of
Kings County to be impressive on paper but a shambles in practice.
Despite state efforts to clean its own house,16 the Kings County
criminal justice system continued to be plagued by lengthy delays.
Those delays, in turn, had a detrimental effect on bail hearings.
Initial bail proceedings were either very brief or adjourned alto-
gether, and the determinations made were often based on incom-
plete or inadequate information.17 Although there was no limit to
Court violated plaintiffs' sixth and fourteenth amendment rights to a speedy trial
with due process of law. Accordingly, the district court entered a preliminary
injunction directing that detainees held for trial for more than six months be tried
or released on their own recognizance within forty-five days of their written request
for trial. Considering the tremendous number of detainees held in the Brooklyn
House of Detention for more than six months, the detrimental effect of such
incarceration on the detainees, and want of immediate state remedies to provide
speedy trials, the district court again chose not to abstain.
In reversing, the Second Circuit admitted that "lengthy pretrial confinement
continue[d] to be the rule in Kings County, despite reform measures instituted by the
state courts." 499 F.2d at 1349. However, with a primary focus on the "individual
review" criteria of Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514 (1972), the circuit court admonished
the lower court for trying to accomplish too much too fast:
Relief from unconstitutional delays in criminal trials is not available in
wholesale lots. Whether an individual has been denied his right to a speedy
trial must be determined ad hoc on a case-by-case basis.
499 F.2d at 1351. The Second Circuit did not comment directly on the district court's
abstention decision in Wallace II.
15. Wallace v. Kern, 520 F.2d 400 (2d Cir. 1975), cert denied, - U.S. -, 96
S. Ct. 1109 (1976) [hereinafter cited as Wallace III].
16. Following the district court order of Wallace I, the Kings County Supreme
Court imposed its own limitations upon the number of cases that could be handled by
a Legal Aid Society lawyer at one time. The Society responded in kind with
implementation of a new system to provide continuity of representation by a single
attorney for each case. Wallace III, supra note 15, at 401-02 n.3.
The Kings County Supreme Court implemented a variety of administrative
steps, including increasing the number of criminal courts, which lessened trial delay.
The information-gathering process on the record of detainees was also improved.
Consequently, the first few months of 1974 saw a 30% reduction in the number of
defendants awaiting trial for six months or more. However, Judge Judd found that
the statistical improvement in the average length of pretrial detention still fell far
short of the speedy trial requirement. Wallace II, supra note 14, 371 F. Supp. at
1389.
17. The Second Circuit's summary of the district court's finding is illustrative of
the inadequacy of the state court's bail determinations:
Judge Judd found that certain sources of information relative to the bail
decision are of great significance, namely, the New York State Criminal
Valparaiso University Law Review, Vol. 11, No. 1 [1976], Art. 5
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:.e number of times a detainee could apply for bail review, 8 that
possibility proved in reality to be a hollow procedural safeguard.
The district court found that even if a detainee were able to push his
appeal through channels to the point of review, the judges on appeal
merely gave determinative weight to the initial defective bail
decision. 19
Noting that these circumstances clearly deprived plaintiffs of
their due process right to adequate bail review,20 Judge Judd
ordered broad improvements in the state court procedure. The
court ruled that an evidentiary hearing for bail determination must
be held on demand anytime after 72 hours from a detainee's original
arraignment and whenever new evidence or changes in facts would
justify additional hearings. The court further ordered that the
hearings should be of an adversary nature and that the detainees
would be entitled to a written statement of the judge's reasons for
denying or fixing bail.21
Investigation Information Service (NYSIIS) report, an ROR (Release on
own Recognizance) sheet. The NYSIIS report contains a listing of all of the
defendant's arrests, but is usually incomplete with respect to the disposition
of those cases. The ROR sheet contains information on a defendant's
background and community ties. While the Pre-Trial Service Agency, an
organization funded by the federal and state governments which provides
information to the court to assist it in making decisions on bail, endeavors to
verify the assertions in the ROR sheet, Judge Judd found that in most cases
it is unable to do so prior to the initial bail hearing.... The court found
that consideration is often given to open charges in the NYSIIS report but
denied as to unverified favorable information in the ROR sheet.
Wallace III, supra note 15, at 402. Additional testimony as to the insufficiency of
initial bail determination was recorded in a footnote to the above text:
The Administrative Judge of the Criminal Court ha[d] directed the judges
to put the reasons supporting their bail decisions in writing on the bail
papers. The district court found that, although many judges put such
reasons on the record, only a few put them on the papers. Moreover, the
record of bail proceedings is not transcribed.
Id. at 402 n.5.
18. Id. at 407.
19. Id. at 402.
20. Relying on Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471 (1972), Judge Judd ruled that
the bail determination and review procedures of Kings County lacked the evidentiary
quality implicit in the due process guarantee of the fourteenth amendment:
[D]ue process requires "that a decision which may result in prolonged
confinement shall be based on a full evaluation of the facts, with an
opportunity to present or controvert any pertinent evidence, and with a
written statement of the reasons why a particular bail determination is
reached."
Wallace III, supra note 15, at 403 (quoting the district court order).
21. Id. The pertinent parts of the district court order read as follows:
ORDERED ... pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2201, that a criminal defendant,
et al.: Federal Abstention and the Demise State Bail Review (Wallace v. K
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On appeal, the Second Circuit did not disturb the district court's
findings of fact that the overburdened criminal courts had lost their
ability to furnish bail review on demand to indigent detainees.
Rather, it ruled that the district court injunction "created an
intrusion upon existing criminal process which was fissiparous and
gratuitous."22 Chastising the district court for ignoring the prior
abstention rulings of the Second Circuit in previous Wallace
appeals, 2s the circuit court reversed Judge Judd's order on the
charged with a felony in Kings County and confined at any institution
under the care, custody and control of the defendant Department of
Correction be entitled
(a) to a hearing at which the People shall recommend what form
of security if any, would secure the defendant's appearance in Court
and, only if monetary bail is recommended, the People shall present
evidence of the need therefore, and the reasons why alternative
conditions of security should not be available; and at which the
defendant shall be present and may present evidence cognizable by
the court on the factors negating the need for money bail, which
hearing shall be had, on written or oral demand, and on five days
notice to the People, at any time after 72 hours after arraignment or
as new evidence or change in facts may justify thereafter.
(b) the prosecution shall have the burden of proving the need
for monetary bail and shall state the reasons why non-financial
conditions of release, as well as other financial alternatives
prescribed by state statute (CPL Sec. 520.10) will not assure the
accused's reappearance at trial.
(c) this evidentiary hearing must be given within five (5) days
after a demand is made or at the next scheduled court appearance
of the defendant whichever is sooner.
(d) the demand may be made orally in open court or in
writing, pro se or by counsel.
(e) if the demand is made in writing it shall specify
information sufficient to identify the defendant and shall also set
forth the current conditions under which the defendant may be
released and in case of alleged new evidence or changes in
circumstance, the new circumstances or evidence:
(f) pretrial incarceration of sixty days shall be a change in
facts sufficient to justify a de novo bail hearing; and it is further
ORDERED ... that a criminal defendant is entitled to receive a written
statement of the reasons for denying or fixing bail including the facts relied
on and to have a de novo bail hearing upon five (5) days notice to the People, if
he/she is held in custody without a written statement of reasons for the
instant bail determination.
Id. at 403 n.7.
22. Id. at 408.
23. The circuit court was not pleased that its prior Wallace opinion had failed
to quell the intrusive fervor of the district court:
While the [district court] held that the issue of the effect of delay on the
coercion of guilty pleas had to be determined on a case-by-case basis, it
Valparaiso University Law Review, Vol. 11, No. 1 [1976], Art. 5
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grounds that it was "violative of the principles of comity and
federalism as defined by the Supreme Court in Younger v. Harris."2 4
THE CONTEMPORARY ABSTENTION DOCTRINE
Younger v. Harris26 represents the current federal abstention
doctrine barring intervention into pending state criminal pro-
ceedings except under the extraordinary circumstances outlined by
the Court. According to Younger, federal courts may enjoin state
criminal proceedings only if the defendants are victims of some bad
faith prosecution or an obviously unconstitutional statute, or if the
defendants would suffer immediate irreparable injury absent fed-
eral assistance. Although some authorities have argued that the
Younger doctrine will not stand the test of time,26 a series of recent
Supreme Court decisions has upheld and even extended the Younger
abstention rules.27 Accordingly, the circuit court in Wallace III
cannot be faulted for using Younger as the authoritative yardstick
with which to measure the abstention issue before it. However, a
careful analysis of the fact situation in Wallace III clearly shows
that the circuit court erred in applying the Younger doctrine.
Without federal relief, the detainees in Wallace III were forced to
endure an ongoing and irreparable loss of state bail review. As a
result the Second Circuit should have treated the Wallace situation
as an appropriate exception to the general abstention rule of
Younger v. Harris.
The Abstention Doctrine of YOUNGER V. HARRIS
In Younger the Supreme Court set forth a two-element test
which it synthesized from its own traditional equity principles. 28
apparently considered the evidence developed at the hearing sufficiently
compelling, despite the prior admonitions of this court, to mandate pretrial
evidentiary bail hearings on demand.
Id. at 404 (emphasis added). In this frame of mind the circuit court proceeded to its
abstention decision.
24. Id. In support of its choice of Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971), as
controlling authority on abstention questions, the Second Circuit cited several recent
Supreme Court decisions which have applied the Younger abstention doctrine. See
note 27 infra.
25. 401 U.S. 37 (1971).
26. See, e.g., Wechsler, Federal Courts, State Criminal Law and the First
Amendment, 49 N.Y.U.L. REV. 740 (1974).
27. See, e.g, Rizzo v. Goode, - U.S. -. 96 S. Ct. 598 (1976) (civil rights
action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against city police); Helfant v. Kugler, 421 U.S. 117
(1975) (criminal trial for perjury); Schlesinger v. Councilman, 420 U.S. 738 (1975)
(army court martial for off-duty sale of marijuana); Huffman v. Pursue, Ltd., 420
U.S. 592 (1975) (civil trial for obscene nuisance); O'Shea v. Littleton, 414 U.S. 488
(1974) (civil rights action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against state judge).
28. See Fenner v. Boykin, 271 U.S. 240 (1926); Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123
(1908).
1976]
et al.: Federal Abstention and the Demise State Bail Review (Wallace v. K
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The test reflects the older common law rule that courts sitting in
equity should not act to restrain a criminal prosecution when the
moving party has an adequate remedy at law or when the party will
not suffer irreparable injury due to denial of equitable relief.29
These two equity principles were employed by the Court in Younger
to complement the unique American concepts of comity30 and
federalism.3' Thus, the Younger decision required federal courts
generally to abstain from enjoining pending criminal proceedings in
state courts.32 However, the Court went on to say that the federal
bench may intervene in certain extraordinary situations. According
to Younger, injunctive relief is proper under 42 U.S.C. § 198333 when
Early in this century it was expected that Ex parte Young wouTd exert an
"enormous influence to extend further the exercise of the jurisdiction of the federal
courts to grant equitable relief against unconstitutional penalties and prosecutions
under state authority." Hutcheson, A Case for Three Judges, 47 HARV. L. REV. 795,
799 n.9 (1934). However, the years since 1908 have seen a variety of legislative and
judicial retreats from the rule of Ex parte Young and Fenner v. Boyk~in. Those
retreats include:
[T]he three judge court act, 28 U.S.C. § 2281; the Johnson Act of 1934,
limiting federal jurisdiction to enjoin state rate orders, 28 U.S.C. § 1342;
and the Tax Injunction Act of 1937, limiting federal jurisdiction to
enjoin state tax collection, 28 U.S.C. § 1341. On the judicial side, [they]
include: the requirement of exhaustion of state "administrative" reme-
dies, Prentis v. Atlantic Coast Line Co., 211 U.S. 210 (1908); the doctrine
that the federal court should postpone exercise of its jurisdiction if a
state issue may make unnecessary decision of the federal claim, Rail-
road Commission of Texas v. Pullman Co., 312 U.S. 496 (1941); and the
doctrine that the federal court should relinquish jurisdiction where
necessary to avoid needless conflict with the administration by a state of
its own affairs, Burford v,. Sun Oil Co., 319 U.S. 315 (1943); Alabama
Public School Commission v. Southern Ry., 341 U.S. 341 (1951).
AL STUDY OF THE DIVISION OF JURISDICTION BETWEEN STATE AND FEDERAL
COURTS § 1371 (commentary) (1969). The retreat from Ex parte Young and from
Fenner has culminated today in the abstention doctrine of Younger v. Harris.
29. Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 43-44 (1971).
30. Id at 44. "Comity" is often defined with the ambiguous phrase "proper
respect for state function." Id. To be more concrete, it can be equated with the
political-philosophical view that national government will be most efficient if the
states and their institutions are left free to perform their separate functions in their
separate ways. Cf. C. WRIGHT, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF FEDERAL COURTS § 52 (2d
ed. 1970).
31. The Younger Court held "federalism" to represent a system of government
in which there is a sensitivity to the legitimate interests of both state and national
governments, and in which the national government, anxious though it may be to
vindicate and protect federal rights and interests, always endeavors to do so in ways
that will not unduly interfere with the legitimate activities of the states. 401 U.S. at
44.
32. Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 43 (1971).
33. To establish a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, the moving party must show
that the defending party has deprived him of a right secured by the Constitution or
Valparaiso University Law Review, Vol. 11, No. 1 [1976], Art. 5
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a state defendant shows that he will suffer "irreparable harm of a
great and immediate nature" if the state proceeding is not
enjoined34 Alternately, the irreparable harm requirement may be
satisfied by some bad faith harrassment by the state,s or "other
situation calling for federal intervention."s6 If the injury suffered by
the defendant is only the cost, anxiety and inconvenience incidental
to every state criminal proceeding brought lawfully and in good
fafth, such injury will not be considered irreparable for abstention
purposes.37
The Younger Court determined that a defendant is threatened
with irreparable harm whenever it plainly appears that a defense in
laws of the United States, and that such deprivation was achieved under color of state
law. Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144 (1970).
34. Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 43-49 (1971). See also Huffman v. Pursue,
Ltd., 420 U.S. 592, 600 (1975); O'Shea v. Littleton, 414 U.S. 488, 499-504 (1974)
(dictum).
35. Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 53-54 (1971).
36. The Court briefly observed:
There may, of course, be extraordinary circumstances in which the
necessary irreparable injury can be shown even in the absence of the
usual prerequisites of bad faith and harrassment. For example ... we
indicated:
It is of course conceivable that a statute might be flagrantly
and patently violative of express constitutional prohibitions
in every clause, sentence and paragraph, and in whatever
manner and against whomever an effort might be made to
apply it. 313 U.S. at 402, 85 L. Ed. at 1424.
Other unusual situations calling for federal intervention might also
arise, but there is no point in our attempting now to specify what they
might be.
401 U.S. at 53-54.
37. Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 46 (1971). See also Schlesinger v.
Councilman, 420 U.S. 738, 754 (1975); Douglas v. City of Jeanette, 319 U.S. 157, 164
(1943).
It is beyond reason that the ordeal of the indigent unlucky enough to be arrested
in Kings County constitutes the "cost, anxiety, and inconvenience incidental to every
state criminal proceeding brought lawfully and in good faith" that was excluded
from the list of irreparable injuries by the Younger Court. The district court in
Wallace found it not uncommon for those unable to make bail to be held in custody
for twelve to fifteen months before trial. Wallace II, supra note 14, 371 F. Supp. at
1386. The uncontested testimony of experts was that the long and uncertain
confinement produced intense mental anxiety and physical deterioration throughout
the inmate population, often leading to a despondency that culminated in attempted
suicide. Id. at 1388. Unable to make bail and return home, the detainees often lost
contact with key witnesses for their defense. Whether or not the detainee was
ultimately convicted, his long confinement was certain to provoke other personal
problems such as loss of a job, strain on family ties, and lack of monetary
compensation for time lost when found innocent. Id.
et al.: Federal Abstention and the Demise State Bail Review (Wallace v. K
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state court will not afford adequate protection for the defendant's
constitutional rights.3  If the defendant has an opportunity to
vindicate those rights in the state forum, then the state has provided
him with an adequate remedy at law and federal intervention will
not be ordered.3 9 However, if state court procedures are unable to
protect the constitutional rights of state criminal defendants, fed-
eral intervention to protect those rights is appropriate as an
exception to the general federal abstention rule.
Application of the YOUNGER Rule
The Second Circuit relied primarily on two Supreme Court
cases, O'Shea v. Littleton40 and Gerstein v. Pugh,41 for guidance in
applying the Younger abstention rules to the facts of Wallace III. 42
The Court in O'Shea decided that the requested court order would
create an unwarranted intrusion into the state court and therefore
held that abstention was proper. Abstention was not found proper
in Gerstein, however, because only a small federal role in the state
criminal process was foreseen. The district court order in Wallace
III falls between these two cases.
In O'Shea, citizens of Cairo, Illinois brought a class action
against a county magistrate and judge who allegedly engaged in a
continuing practice of racial discrimination in bail, sentencing and
jury fees. The plaintiffs sought a federal injunction aimed at
preventing similar discrimination in future state trials. The district
court dismissed for want of jurisdiction. The Seventh Circuit
reversed, holding that if plaintiffs proved their allegations, injunc-
tive relief could be considered by the district court.43
On appeal, the Supreme Court in O'Shea discussed the case's
abstention ramifications in dicta only.44 The Court indicated that the
38. Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 43-49 (1971). See also Huffman v. Pursue,
Ltd., 420 U.S. 592, 600 (1975); O'Shea v. Littleton, 414 U.S. 488, 499-504 (1974)
(dictum).
39. Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 45 (1971).
40. 414 U.S. 488 (1974).
41. 420 U.S. 103 (1975). See Comment, Pretrial Detainees Have A Fourth
Amendment Right To A Nonadversary, Judicial Determination of Probable Cause,
10 VAL. U.L. REV. 199 (1975).
42. Wallace III, supra note 15, at 404-08.
43. Littleton v. Berbling, 468 F.2d 389, 415 (7th Cir. 1974).
44. The Court dismissed O'Shea for lack of standing, concluding that the
plaintiffs had failed to present a "case or controversy." 414 U.S. 488, 493-99 (1974).
Its discussion of the abstention issue was entirely dicta and therefore of ques-
tionable value as strong precedent on the subject. Cf. Int'l Longshoremen's &
Warehousemen's Union v. Boyd, 347 U.S. 222 (1954); United Pub. Workers of
America v. Mitchell, 330 U.S. 75 (1946); Coffman v. Breeze Corp., 323 U.S. 316
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strict abstention quidelines of Younger were intended to prevent an
ongoing federal audit of state criminal proceedings caused by
continuous or piecemeal interruption of the state case through
relitigation on the merits in the federal courts.45 "[T]he special
delicacy of the adjustment to be preserved between federal equitable
power and state administration of its own law" would thereby be
sustained.46 The Court also stated that, regardless of the nature of the
requested relief, the plaintiffs were not entitled to injunctive relief
because they had failed to plead satisfactorily irreparable harm and
inadequacy of state remedies. 47 The Court then speculated that the
injunction requested by plaintiffs would require the day-to-day
supervision of the state court that Younger prohibited. 48
The circuit court in Wallace recognized that the relief requested
in Gerstein v. Pugh49 did not entail such constant federal supervision
of state criminal cases. In Gerstein, a class action was instituted in
federal district court requesting that persons arrested without
warrants and held for detention under Florida law be granted a
probable cause hearing. The complainants were arrested in Dade
County, Florida under a prosecutor's information, which according to
state procedure precluded any right to a preliminary hearing on
probable cause for detention. The district court found that the fourth
and fourteenth amendments gave complainants the right to a
complete judicial hearing on the question of probable cause for
pretrial detention, and prescribed detailed procedures for the
protection of that right in state courtsW The Fifth Circuit affirmed
(1944). The Second Circuit acknowledged that the O'Shea opinion was mostly dicta.
Wallace III, supra note 15, at 406.
45. O'Shea v. Littleton, 414 U.S. 488, 500 (1974).
46. Id.
47. Id. at 502.
48. The Court constructed the proposed order as follows:
An injunction of the type contemplated by [plaintiffs] and the Court of
Appeals would disrupt the normal course of proceedings in the state
courts via resort to the federal suit for determination of the claim ab
initio, just as would the request for injunctive relief from an ongoing
state prosecution against the federal plaintiff which was found to be
unwarranted in Younger. Moreover, it would require for its enforce-
ment the continuous supervision by the federal court over the conduct of
the [state officials] in the course of future criminal trial proceedings
involving any of the members of the [plaintiffs'] broadly defined class.
414 U.S. at 501. The validity of the Court's assumption concerning the contents of the
O'Shea order is an interesting topic, but beyond the scope of this comment. See note
55 infra.
49. 420 U.S. 103 (1975).
50. Pugh v. Rainwater, 355 F. Supp. 1286 (S.D. Fla. 1973).
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the district court ruling with respect to the complete judicial hearing
requirement.6 1
On certiorari from the Fifth Circuit, the Supreme Court decided
that intervention was proper in Gerstein. Although five members of
the Court felt that a complete evidentiary proceeding to determine
probable cause was not mandated by the fourth amendment,52 the
Court unanimously held that the prosecutor's decision to file an
information was not by itself a constitutionally sufficient determi-
nation of probable cause for detention in cases of warrantless
arrest.5 Both the majority and concurring opinions found a total
lack of state remedies to provide complainants with a means of
obtaining the constitutionally required level of probable cause
review.5' Therefore, federal relief could be granted without vio-
lating the abstention rules of Younger.
In contrast to the anticipated order of O'Shea,55 the Gerstein
directive did not interrupt state prosecutions in progress.5 The
51. Pugh v. Rainwater, 483 F.2d 778, 788 (5th Cir. 1973).
52. The four concurring justices (Stewart, Douglas, Brennan and Marshall)
agreed that the prosecutor's information was not a constitutionally sufficient
determination of probable cause for detention, but disagreed with the majority
viewpoint that due process does not require a complete hearing in such cases. 420
U.S. at 127. Cf. Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471 (1972). See Comment, Pretrial
Detainees Have A Fourth Amendment Right To A Nonadversary, Judicial Determi-
nation of Probable Cause, 10 VAL. U.L. REV. 199, 203 (1975).
53. 420 U.S. 103, 114-23 (1975).
54. Id. at 126. See also Wallace III at 407.
55. In retrospect, it is unclear why the O'Shea Court forecast such an extreme
order for the district court. It seems plausible that the district court in O'Shea could
have issued a procedural order that would have been no more intrusive on state
affairs than the Gerstein order.
56. The Court in Gerstein explained the nature of the intrusion created by its
order as follows:
[Plaintiffs'] claim for relief was not barred by the equitable restrictions
on federal intervention in state prosecutions. Younger v. Harris, 401
U.S. 37, 27 L. Ed. 2d 669, 91 S. Ct. 746 (1971). The injunction was not
directed at the state prosecutions as such, but only at the legality of
pretrial detention without a judicial hearing, an issue that could not be
raised in defense of criminal prosecution. The order to hold preliminary
hearings could not prejudice the conduct of the trial on the merits. See
Conover v. Montemuro, 477 F.2d 1073, 1082 (3rd Cir. 1972); cf. Perez v.
Ledesma, 401 U.S. 82, 27 L. Ed. 2d 701, 91 S. Ct. 674 (1971); Stefanelli v.
Minard, 342 U.S. 117, 96 L. Ed. 138, 72 S. Ct. 118 (1951).
420 U.S. at 108 n.9. See also Wallace III, supra note 15, at 406-07; Mudd v. Busse
68 F.R.D. 522, 532 (N.D. Ind. 1975). Full implementation of the Gerstein order had the
practical effect of discouraging challenges to the state system in federal court.
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order merely required that a procedure be established whereby the
Florida courts would provide a magistrate's hearing for deter-
mining probable cause for detention following arrest.57 Beyond that
initial requirement, no federal role in the process was anticipated.58
In comparison, the O'Shea majority assumed that intervention in
that case would involve continuous post-order supervision of all
future criminal trial proceedings involving members of the plain-
tiffs' broadly defined class.5 9 Any member of the plaintiff class
brought to trial would be able to allege discrimination by the judge
and demand an immediate federal review of the state court's
handling of the merits. 60 The Supreme Court found such ongoing
relitigation of state trials to be "in sharp conflict with the principles
of equitable restraint which this Court has recognized in Younger v.
Harris.'" 61 Thus, in order to come under the protection of Younger
and Gerstein, the district court order in Wallace III would have to
afford a much lesser degree of ongoing federal supervision than was
present in O'Shea.
THE MISAPPLICATION OF ABSTENTION PRINCIPLES IN Wallace III.
Guided by the illustrative holdings of O'Shea and Gerstein, the
Second Circuit should have affirmed the district court order in
Wallace III. The order of the district court in Wallace III did not
violate the federal rules of abstention, since the bail procedures it
required for the state courts did not invite ongoing relitigation of
state cases in federal court and since the plaintiffs in Wallace had no
effective bail remedy at state law.
Extent of Supervision by the District Court
The Second Circuit ruled in Wallace III that the district court
order created "the kind of continuing surveillance found to be
objectionable in O'Shea."62 However, the relief sought in Wallace III
was actually analogous to the order in Gerstein63 and fell far short of
57. See notes 52-53 supra and accompanying text.
58. The only possibility of subsequent federal involvement would be through a
federal habeas corpus proceeding.
59. See note 48 supra.
60. See notes 47-48 supra and accompanying text.
61. O'Shea v. Littleton, 414 U.S. 488, 502 (1974).
62. Wallace III, supra note 15, at 406.
63. The Wallace III order was admittedly more detailed than the order in
Gerstein. Judge Judd specified exactly the bail procedures that are mandated by the
Constitution and that the New York courts were to employ in providing bail review,
while the Court in Gerstein left such determination to state discretion. However, the
proven inability of the New York courts to act on their own accord with sufficient
success justified Judge Judd's specificity. Also, in the past federal courts have not
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the degree of supervision anticipated by the Court in O'Shea. The
Wallace III order, like that of Gerstein, created little or no post-
decision federal involvement with state proceedings. The court was
obligated to review state enforcement of the new bail standards
whenever an allegation of noncompliance was raised by a detainee,
but the incentive to raise such challenges would weaken as the bail
requirements were implemented. The practical consequences of the
federal injunction in Wallace III would be to reduce the number of
bail complaints raised in the federal forum.
The deficiency in the O'Shea order was that it did not discourage
federal challenges to state procedure. Instead, it would have
created unending federal review of state cases, which the Supreme
Court labeled an "ongoing federal audit of state criminal pro-
ceedings which would indirectly accomplish the kind of interference
that Younger v. Harris sought to prevent."6  The continuing
supervision of state courts, which proved to be a fatal defect
in O'Shea, was not a genuinely foreseeable problem in Wallace III.
Consequently, the Second Circuit erred in relying upon "continuing
supervision" as the cornerstone upon which to build its abstention
decision.
Adequate Remedy at State Law
The Second Circuit committed a second error in Wallace III by
ruling that adequate bail review was available to pretrial detainees
in Kings County. Its holding flies in the face of Supreme Court case
law and ignores the similarities between Gerstein and Wallace IIIon
the adequate state remedy issue.
hesitated to issue injunctive orders of great detail when the circumstances so
warranted. For example, in Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471 (1972), the Court
issued detailed procedures for the conduct of parole violation hearings at the state
level. In Morrissey, two Iowa convicts whose paroles were revoked by the Iowa Board
of Parole filed habeas corpus petitions in federal court alleging that they had been
denied due process because their paroles were terminated without a revocation
hearing. On appeal to the Supreme Court, the majority found that minimum due
process required a complete evidentiary hearing by the Board in all matters of parole
revocation. The Court itemized the procedural steps required of the state to insure
minimum due process, id. at 484-89, in a manner similar to that of Judge Judd's
order in Wallace III. See note 21 supra.
In Morrissey, the state interest involved was insuring the re-imprisonment of
convicts who had violated the requirements of their parole. In comparison, Wallace
III involved the less compelling interest of insuring the appearance of presumptively
innocent men at trial. Logically, if the federal courts have been allowed to intervene
with orders of great specificity in the first case, they certainly should be able to do
likewise in the latter.
64. 414 U.S. at 500.
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The district court in Wallace III found. that meaningful bail
review in Kings County had assumed the Gerstein characteristic of
"total unavailability."65 Due to an overburdened legal bureaucracy,
the implementation of state statutory bail proVisvions had collapsed.
Initial bail hearings were of a -curs6ry nature, and the decisions
made therein were o'ften based on incomplete informaiopn.6 Subse-
quent bail appeals were decided without a written transcript of -the
first hearing and with deference -to. the initiai-findings of fact.6
Furthermore, state habeas corpus did not provide a satisfactory
alternative to the defective bail appeal* procedure. Habeas corpus
petitions were reviewed by the same judges who sat in the"standard
appeal cases, using the same incomplete background information.6
The aggregate effect of those problems was to paralyze the execution
of state bail review laws in the state. courts.
Nullification of meaningful bail review through paralysis of the
state court system should fall within the Supreme Court's definition
of an inadequate state remedy. In.Monroe v. Pape,6 9 the Court ruled
that § 1983 was intended to provide. a -federal remedy where the
state remedy, though adequate in theory, was not available in
practice to provide relief for persons who had suffered injury to
their constitutional rights.70  The Court declared that "[i]t is no
answer that the State has a law .which -if 'eiforced, would give
relief."71 The holding in Monroe was acknowledged and applied by
the Second Circuit prior to its decision in Wallace III72
Monroe's definition of inadequate state remedy describes pre-
cisely the situation involved in Wallace III. The New York bail
remedies, though adequate in theory, were unavailable 'in practice
because the courts lacked the time and resources to effec'tuate them.
But in spite of Monroe,73 the Second Circuit refused to give
determinative weight to the de facto termination of effective bail
review in Kings County. The Second Circuit felt that so long as
there was a remedy at law in the form of state habeas corpus, there
was not a "total unavailability" of review. In effect, Wallace III held
65. See Wallace III, supra note 15, at 407.
66. See note 17 supra and accompanying text.
67. Id.
68. N.Y. Civ. PRAC. LAw § 7002 (McKinney 1976).
69. 365 U.S. 167 (1961). See also McNeese v. Board of Education, 373 U.S. 668,
671-72 (1963).
70. 365 U.S. at 174.
71. Id. at 183 (emphasis added).
72. See Potwora v. Dillon, 368 F.2d 74, 77 (2d Cir. 1967).
73. The Second Circuit mentioned Monroe only once, in a footnote. See Wallace
III, supra note 15, at 407 n.13.
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that the availability of relief on paper was enough to satisfy the
adequate state remedy test of Younger v. Harris.74 Such depen-
dence-on statutory form violates the basic equity principles which
underscore the Younger doctrine. The inadequate state bail review
procedures of New York caused irreparable damage to the due
process rights of pretrial detainees in Kings County, and federal
intervention was the only realistic chance for correction. Federal
bail relief should have been granted.
CONCLUSION
The Second Circuit Court of Appeals justified its Wallace III
decision with the comment: "[The federal courts] are not ombuds-
men charged with the responsibility of reforming the state penal
system."75 - Its sense of mission certainly conflicts with the judicial
responsibilities inherent in many § 1983 civil rights cases. It also
rejects the self-image held by other distinguished members of the
federal judiciary:
I [have] always thought that one of this Court's most
important roles is to provide a formidable bulwark against
governmental violation of the constitutional safeguards[,]
securing in our free society the legitimate expectations of
every person to innate human dignity and sense of worth. 6
It is hoped that the holding in Wallace II will be a short-lived
aberration from the abstention doctrine of Younger v. Harris. The
federal abstention doctrine will remain vulnerable to similar misuse
so long as Wallace II is allowed to stand.
74. Id. at 407-08.
75. Id. at 408.
76. Paul v. Davis, - U.S. , 96 S. Ct. 1155, 1158 (1976) (Brennan, J.,
dissenting).
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